President Obama has finally made his long-awaited announcement on the future of US strategy in Afghanistan. He's sending an extra 30,000 American troops, with the health warning that they will begin to withdraw in 2011. The decision has met with a sceptical response in Afghanistan itself.
The stated aim of the western military involvement in Afghanistan is to fight Al Qaeda and its Taliban allies, and make it harder for Islamist terrorists to attack targets in the west. One of the major criticisms of the increased western involvement in recent months is that now the troops are focusing not just on fighting the west's enemies, but also on trying to protect and strengthen the Afghan government (which, as the controversial recent election showed, is widely corrupt). Critics call it 'mission creep' and accuse Mr Obama and others of trying to find new reasons to justify their involvement in Afghanistan, when they should have pulled out already.
That's believed to be the view of the US Vice-President, Joe Biden. But for leaders like Mr Obama and Gordon Brown, there's more to consider, namely what'll happen when the western troops withdraw. Now that Mr Obama has named 2011 as the start of the end of the mission (as an answer to one of the big criticisms of America's mission in Iraq, namely that there was no exit strategy), that deadline will dominate the way all interested parties act in Afghanistan. And it may end up to the Taliban's advantage.
The Taliban now knows that, if it can avoid complete obliteration over the next couple of years (with help from sympathisers in Pakistan, this shouldn't be a problem), the western troops will go home. Then it can take on the Afghan government. The Taliban did exactly that when it initially seized power in Afghanistan back in 1996. It was a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in which Al Qaeda harboured and trained the terrorists which carried out 9/11.
So, if the US and its allies are unable to help the Afghan government improve its security capabilities sufficiently in the coming months, there could be big trouble ahead. Leaving Afghanistan in 2011 might suit short-term western political opinion, but if the Taliban is able to regain control once the Americans have left, it would probably allow Al Qaeda the opportunity to strengthen, and therefore make a spectacular attack on the US or Europe far more likely. Although it may cause an increase in the human cost in terms of American, British and other international lives, spending the time between now and 2011 putting the Afghans in a position to defeat the Taliban is essential to the ultimate success of the west's mission.
Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts
Wednesday, December 02, 2009
Wednesday, October 28, 2009
Paying The Taliban To Switch Sides
President Obama is signing into a law a new bill which, among other things, includes a provision allowing the US to offer Taliban fighters money to put down their weapons and leave the insurgency in Afghanistan. This follows a similar scheme which operated with some success in Iraq. The idea is that ex-insurgents will be paid to defend their towns instead of attack them, and once the war is over will easily fit back into whatever passes for normal society.
This is another triumph for pragmatism over ideology in America's approach. If the promise of democracy and freedom isn't enough to convince Afghans to leave the Taliban, then the promise of a few quid and a steady job might be. It makes a bit of a mockery of the past rhetoric of US politicians including President Bush, which has often had a sort of 'our society is better than yours, we're giving it to you and you should be grateful for it' undercurrent to it.
But it would be wrong to assume the Obama people are the first to realise that hard cash might be more effective than western dogma in Afghanistan. In October 2001, the US bombing of Taliban positions initially had little obvious effect. Changing tack, the CIA quickly despatched operatives to Afghanistan with suitcases full of dollars, to literally buy off individual tribal leaders and warlords, getting them to stop supporting the Taliban. Only then did the US-backed offensive start to make any progress. This latest policy of the Obama administration helps show us that, for all of the west's efforts in Afghanistan since 2001, there's still an awful lot that hasn't changed at all.
This is another triumph for pragmatism over ideology in America's approach. If the promise of democracy and freedom isn't enough to convince Afghans to leave the Taliban, then the promise of a few quid and a steady job might be. It makes a bit of a mockery of the past rhetoric of US politicians including President Bush, which has often had a sort of 'our society is better than yours, we're giving it to you and you should be grateful for it' undercurrent to it.
But it would be wrong to assume the Obama people are the first to realise that hard cash might be more effective than western dogma in Afghanistan. In October 2001, the US bombing of Taliban positions initially had little obvious effect. Changing tack, the CIA quickly despatched operatives to Afghanistan with suitcases full of dollars, to literally buy off individual tribal leaders and warlords, getting them to stop supporting the Taliban. Only then did the US-backed offensive start to make any progress. This latest policy of the Obama administration helps show us that, for all of the west's efforts in Afghanistan since 2001, there's still an awful lot that hasn't changed at all.
Saturday, September 26, 2009
Obama's Big Decision On Afghanistan
President Obama has got to decide whether to send yet more troops to Afghanistan. That's after the American commander of NATO forces in the country made a formal request for backup, thought to be around 30,000 extra personnel. In a report that was recently leaked, General Stanley McChrystal commented that the west's mission in Afghanistan would probably fail unless more troops were sent to bolster the force.
Mr Obama must be thinking that it wasn't supposed to be like this. A year and more ago, when he was still just a candidate running for the top job, it was easy to say that President Bush had done the wrong thing in focusing on Iraq to the exclusion of Afghanistan, and that a President Obama would change that. Iraq bad, Afghanistan good.
But now he's in the Oval Office, Mr Obama is being forced to see things from a different perspective. It's a well-worn cliche to say that Afghanistan is a graveyard of armies. But it's true enough, from Britain's various wars in the country during the 19th and early 20th century, to the Soviet Union's ill-fated occupation of the 1980s. Now that the Americans and NATO are in, they've realised that more resources are needed to do the job, otherwise they will join the long list of defeated military forces which were forced to leave Afghanistan.
So President Obama's choice is this. The first option would be to accept that the mission will never achieve its objectives, and announce plans to begin to pull out. This would probably be welcomed by some of America's NATO allies (like Italy), which are only now beginning to suffer the kind of casualties all too familiar to the US and Britain. But it would be a tough sell to the American people. After all the US doesn't like losing, and defeat in Afghanistan would be seen by many as defeat at the hands of those who attacked the US on 9/11.
The other option is to give General McChrystal what he wants, and commit to Afghanistan for the long haul. This is also a tough sell to both America's NATO allies and the American people, because the cost in terms of both lives and money may well be huge. In some ways this would be a far riskier option, because there are so many difficult-to-predict aspects of the Afghan issue which could have a major impact, such as the stability of the apparently corrupt Afghan government and the security situation in Pakistan next door. If Mr Obama takes this choice, he will be trusting to luck as well as the abilities of his military forces.
Mr Obama must be thinking that it wasn't supposed to be like this. A year and more ago, when he was still just a candidate running for the top job, it was easy to say that President Bush had done the wrong thing in focusing on Iraq to the exclusion of Afghanistan, and that a President Obama would change that. Iraq bad, Afghanistan good.
But now he's in the Oval Office, Mr Obama is being forced to see things from a different perspective. It's a well-worn cliche to say that Afghanistan is a graveyard of armies. But it's true enough, from Britain's various wars in the country during the 19th and early 20th century, to the Soviet Union's ill-fated occupation of the 1980s. Now that the Americans and NATO are in, they've realised that more resources are needed to do the job, otherwise they will join the long list of defeated military forces which were forced to leave Afghanistan.
So President Obama's choice is this. The first option would be to accept that the mission will never achieve its objectives, and announce plans to begin to pull out. This would probably be welcomed by some of America's NATO allies (like Italy), which are only now beginning to suffer the kind of casualties all too familiar to the US and Britain. But it would be a tough sell to the American people. After all the US doesn't like losing, and defeat in Afghanistan would be seen by many as defeat at the hands of those who attacked the US on 9/11.
The other option is to give General McChrystal what he wants, and commit to Afghanistan for the long haul. This is also a tough sell to both America's NATO allies and the American people, because the cost in terms of both lives and money may well be huge. In some ways this would be a far riskier option, because there are so many difficult-to-predict aspects of the Afghan issue which could have a major impact, such as the stability of the apparently corrupt Afghan government and the security situation in Pakistan next door. If Mr Obama takes this choice, he will be trusting to luck as well as the abilities of his military forces.
Friday, September 18, 2009
For Obama, Afghanistan Is More Important Than A Missile Shield
President Obama's decision to abandon US plans for a missile defence shield in eastern Europe has made big news around the world over the last couple of days. The shield would have involved putting facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic from where any missiles heading towards western Europe or the US could have been shot down. The official reason for getting rid of the scheme is that Iran, purportedly the likeliest place from which those missiles might have been launched at the west, isn't as far ahead in its weapons development as had been thought.
As is usually the case in international diplomacy though, that's not the real reason for Mr Obama's decision. In fact, there are plenty of reasons, and the decision has all sorts of consequences which may not be immediately obvious. But the main theme is the sense that Afghanistan is now by far the most important international challenge facing the US, and all its foreign policy decisions are made in that context. In weighing up whether to go ahead with the shield or not, Mr Obama will have thought hard about the impact the decision would have on Afghanistan.
It's been widely said that the decision to scrap the scheme will ease tensions between the US and Russia. This is important because the US needs Russia's help in Afghanistan, and will do for years and probably decades to come. In the short-term, Moscow can allow NATO forces to use both the land and airspace of Russia and some nearby former Soviet republics, which will help their fight against the Taliban. But more significantly, in the long-term, once the Americans, British and the rest have gone, Russia will have a more important role in Afghanistan. The Kremlin likes to have control of countries in its 'backyard' and in future it'll be deals between Russia and local Afghan tribal leaders, rather than guns and air strikes, that keeps Afghanistan stable.
So President Obama's decision will have an impact far into the future. But there are lots of people who aren't happy about it, and those people are mostly in eastern Europe. Countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic want to avoid slipping back into Moscow's 'backyard' and wanted the missile shield as an extra guarantee of their independence from Russia. Not because the Kremlin was about to fire missiles at Warsaw or Prague, but to emphasise that they have American backing and that Moscow shouldn't try any funny business, like shutting off power supplies. That fear is multiplied many times over for Ukraine and especially Georgia, which are desperately trying to resist being sucked back into the Kremlin's orbit. If Russia's price for helping out in Afghanistan is the withdrawal of the missile shield, don't be surprised if they also manage to thwart those two countries' hopes of joining NATO.
As is usually the case in international diplomacy though, that's not the real reason for Mr Obama's decision. In fact, there are plenty of reasons, and the decision has all sorts of consequences which may not be immediately obvious. But the main theme is the sense that Afghanistan is now by far the most important international challenge facing the US, and all its foreign policy decisions are made in that context. In weighing up whether to go ahead with the shield or not, Mr Obama will have thought hard about the impact the decision would have on Afghanistan.
It's been widely said that the decision to scrap the scheme will ease tensions between the US and Russia. This is important because the US needs Russia's help in Afghanistan, and will do for years and probably decades to come. In the short-term, Moscow can allow NATO forces to use both the land and airspace of Russia and some nearby former Soviet republics, which will help their fight against the Taliban. But more significantly, in the long-term, once the Americans, British and the rest have gone, Russia will have a more important role in Afghanistan. The Kremlin likes to have control of countries in its 'backyard' and in future it'll be deals between Russia and local Afghan tribal leaders, rather than guns and air strikes, that keeps Afghanistan stable.
So President Obama's decision will have an impact far into the future. But there are lots of people who aren't happy about it, and those people are mostly in eastern Europe. Countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic want to avoid slipping back into Moscow's 'backyard' and wanted the missile shield as an extra guarantee of their independence from Russia. Not because the Kremlin was about to fire missiles at Warsaw or Prague, but to emphasise that they have American backing and that Moscow shouldn't try any funny business, like shutting off power supplies. That fear is multiplied many times over for Ukraine and especially Georgia, which are desperately trying to resist being sucked back into the Kremlin's orbit. If Russia's price for helping out in Afghanistan is the withdrawal of the missile shield, don't be surprised if they also manage to thwart those two countries' hopes of joining NATO.
Wednesday, September 16, 2009
Fraud In Afghanistan
Official tallies from the Afghan presidential election show that the man already in power, Hamid Karzai, got more than 50% of the vote in last month's poll. That's enough to win the contest outright without the need for a second round run-off election. No problem you'd think, except there's a big health warning on that result. European Union officials say more than a third of the votes for Mr Karzai might be suspect because of fraud.
The issue of fraud is the first of two big problems with the Afghan election. Even if some of Mr Karzai's votes are ruled out, it seems more than likely he'll remain as president. For the last eight years he's run Afghanistan on the basis that he's the best man available, and a man the western nations can do business with. Over the years his credibility has been gradually eroded by allegations of corruption and incompetence within his government. Now, the apparent large-scale fraud in this election means his credibility is at an all-time low. By backing him over the years, the US, Britain and the rest have painted themselves into a corner, because now they're stuck propping up an ineffective administration headed by a fraudster. And as soldiers continue to die, that support is coming at a high price.
The second major issue with last month's election was the low turnout. The recent increase in NATO military action against the Taliban, called Operation Panther's Claw, was supposed to make the situation in Afghanistan stable enough so large amounts of the population would feel encouraged to get out and vote. The offensive led to this summer's increase in the amount of American and British casualties in the south of Afghanistan. And now returns from the election show that, in some areas of Helmand Province, polling stations were reporting turnouts as low as 2%. That's not to say the offensive was a failure, or that the dead soldiers gave their lives for nothing, because the Americans and British have been able to inflict damage on the Taliban and take and hold territory they'd previously been unable to.
However, there's no getting away from the fact that, after eight years of action in Afghanistan, we've just had an election in which the sitting president cheated and in which not all that many people voted. Time for a rethink.
The issue of fraud is the first of two big problems with the Afghan election. Even if some of Mr Karzai's votes are ruled out, it seems more than likely he'll remain as president. For the last eight years he's run Afghanistan on the basis that he's the best man available, and a man the western nations can do business with. Over the years his credibility has been gradually eroded by allegations of corruption and incompetence within his government. Now, the apparent large-scale fraud in this election means his credibility is at an all-time low. By backing him over the years, the US, Britain and the rest have painted themselves into a corner, because now they're stuck propping up an ineffective administration headed by a fraudster. And as soldiers continue to die, that support is coming at a high price.
The second major issue with last month's election was the low turnout. The recent increase in NATO military action against the Taliban, called Operation Panther's Claw, was supposed to make the situation in Afghanistan stable enough so large amounts of the population would feel encouraged to get out and vote. The offensive led to this summer's increase in the amount of American and British casualties in the south of Afghanistan. And now returns from the election show that, in some areas of Helmand Province, polling stations were reporting turnouts as low as 2%. That's not to say the offensive was a failure, or that the dead soldiers gave their lives for nothing, because the Americans and British have been able to inflict damage on the Taliban and take and hold territory they'd previously been unable to.
However, there's no getting away from the fact that, after eight years of action in Afghanistan, we've just had an election in which the sitting president cheated and in which not all that many people voted. Time for a rethink.
Wednesday, August 26, 2009
Karzai Heads For Five More Years
Early results from the election in Afghanistan show a solid lead for the current President, Hamid Karzai. He's leading his main rival, Abdullah Abdullah, by around 43 percent to 34 with about half the votes counted. That means the two men will go head to head again in a run-off election in October, but there seems little doubt that Mr Karzai will win.
After the Taliban was ousted by the US-led coalition late in 2001, there was a bit of a scramble to find someone who could lead Afghanistan. Mr Abdullah was, in those days, foreign minister and spokesman of the Northern Alliance, which had done the legwork for the coalition by driving the Taliban out of the cities and into the hills. The Alliance was a ragtag assortment of various anti-Taliban groups, but because they generally weren't drawn from Afghanistan's Pashtun majority (Mr Abdullah is half-Pashtun, half-Tajik), the west sought out a Pashtun tribal leader who had authority, could speak English, and wasn't linked too closely to the Taliban. Hamid Karzai was just about the only man in Afghanistan who fitted that description, so he got the job.
And although it's now the Afghan people making the decision (or at least the 5 million of them who weren't too frightened by threats of Taliban violence to vote), Hamid Karzai is still the only person the west can think of to lead Afghanistan. They haven't much liked a lot of what he's done since he came to power. He hasn't got a firm enough grip on his country, the critics say, he hasn't done enough to get rid of corruption, or crack down on the Taliban, or sort out the country's infrastructure, or control its borders.
Much of that is true, but it's hardly all Mr Karzai's fault. Afghanistan has always been a tribal, disparate sort of place, with lots of groups of people who have little loyalty towards elders from the next town, let alone government ministers in distant Kabul. As for the man himself, he's played a canny game of late, making sure well-known and popular Afghans such as the controversial General Dostum weighed in on his behalf during the recent campaign. Mr Karzai hardly enjoys overwhelming popular support in Afghanistan, but he's so far been able to get enough of his supporters out to vote. As for those sceptical western leaders, they at least feel they can do business with him. And more to the point, they can't think of anyone else who they'd rather have in his place. Expect Mr Karzai to keep his job for a few years yet.
After the Taliban was ousted by the US-led coalition late in 2001, there was a bit of a scramble to find someone who could lead Afghanistan. Mr Abdullah was, in those days, foreign minister and spokesman of the Northern Alliance, which had done the legwork for the coalition by driving the Taliban out of the cities and into the hills. The Alliance was a ragtag assortment of various anti-Taliban groups, but because they generally weren't drawn from Afghanistan's Pashtun majority (Mr Abdullah is half-Pashtun, half-Tajik), the west sought out a Pashtun tribal leader who had authority, could speak English, and wasn't linked too closely to the Taliban. Hamid Karzai was just about the only man in Afghanistan who fitted that description, so he got the job.
And although it's now the Afghan people making the decision (or at least the 5 million of them who weren't too frightened by threats of Taliban violence to vote), Hamid Karzai is still the only person the west can think of to lead Afghanistan. They haven't much liked a lot of what he's done since he came to power. He hasn't got a firm enough grip on his country, the critics say, he hasn't done enough to get rid of corruption, or crack down on the Taliban, or sort out the country's infrastructure, or control its borders.
Much of that is true, but it's hardly all Mr Karzai's fault. Afghanistan has always been a tribal, disparate sort of place, with lots of groups of people who have little loyalty towards elders from the next town, let alone government ministers in distant Kabul. As for the man himself, he's played a canny game of late, making sure well-known and popular Afghans such as the controversial General Dostum weighed in on his behalf during the recent campaign. Mr Karzai hardly enjoys overwhelming popular support in Afghanistan, but he's so far been able to get enough of his supporters out to vote. As for those sceptical western leaders, they at least feel they can do business with him. And more to the point, they can't think of anyone else who they'd rather have in his place. Expect Mr Karzai to keep his job for a few years yet.
Friday, July 10, 2009
Fifteen Dead In Ten Days
Since I published my earlier post, the deaths of a further six UK soldiers in Iraq have been confirmed, including five members of a single foot patrol. It's becoming harder by the day for the British government and military leadership to justify the price being paid in Afghanistan. No doubt they will still wait to see how the influx of US forces to Helmand affects the situation in the coming weeks and months. But each casualty means that strategy will be given less time to prove itself before a different and more radical option will have to be considered.
Nine Dead In Nine Days
Two more UK troops have died in separate attacks in Afghanistan. That means nine soldiers have been killed in as many days. Since the fighting in Afghanistan began back in 2001, a total of 178 UK troops have now been killed, just one fewer than the number of fatalities during the operation in Iraq.
People die in wars, especially during offensives such as the one currently taking place in Afghanistan. But this latest increase in British casualties confirms that, although things aren't necessarily going badly, the mission is not going as well as the commanders and politicians want.
There are at least two main reasons for this. One is a question of resources. Britain had been fighting the Taliban alone in the most dangerous part of Afghanistan, Helmand Province. But the lack of resources available to the UK military these days means they haven't been able to take and hold territory in the traditional way. So any victory over the Taliban in battle, and any casualties suffered in the process, have not been for very much gain, because the British have had to return to their barracks. Now, with an extra American military focus on Helmand Province, that might change, and this will be the key thing to watch in Afghanistan in the next few months.
Then there's the question of how local Afghan people react to the foreign forces in their country. There aren't all that many reasons why they should be any more thrilled to welcome the NATO troops than they were to embrace the Taliban in the mid-90s or the Russians in the 80s. They know that the British, the Americans and the rest will one day leave, and will doubt whether they have the long term interests of the Afghan people really at heart. Don't forget this is the fourth war Britain has fought in Afghanistan in the last 180 years. It's nowhere near finished, either.
People die in wars, especially during offensives such as the one currently taking place in Afghanistan. But this latest increase in British casualties confirms that, although things aren't necessarily going badly, the mission is not going as well as the commanders and politicians want.
There are at least two main reasons for this. One is a question of resources. Britain had been fighting the Taliban alone in the most dangerous part of Afghanistan, Helmand Province. But the lack of resources available to the UK military these days means they haven't been able to take and hold territory in the traditional way. So any victory over the Taliban in battle, and any casualties suffered in the process, have not been for very much gain, because the British have had to return to their barracks. Now, with an extra American military focus on Helmand Province, that might change, and this will be the key thing to watch in Afghanistan in the next few months.
Then there's the question of how local Afghan people react to the foreign forces in their country. There aren't all that many reasons why they should be any more thrilled to welcome the NATO troops than they were to embrace the Taliban in the mid-90s or the Russians in the 80s. They know that the British, the Americans and the rest will one day leave, and will doubt whether they have the long term interests of the Afghan people really at heart. Don't forget this is the fourth war Britain has fought in Afghanistan in the last 180 years. It's nowhere near finished, either.
Tuesday, August 28, 2007
Kidnapping Works
The Taliban says it's going to free the remaining 19 South Korean hostages its been holding in Afghanistan for more than a month. They were among 23 Christian missionaries initially taken hostage; two have already been freed, while two others were murdered by the Taliban. The deal with South Korea appears to involve some kind of ransom, as well as confirmation from Seoul that it'll pull out its troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year (as was planned anyway), plus an agreement to prevent any more Koreans going to the country.
We hardly needed reminding of the growing strength and confidence of the Taliban, but this saga has done exactly that. Once again the Taliban has acted with total impunity, and it seems neither the international forces nor the Afghan government is in a position to stop them. Many more incidents like this, and the already shaky support (among certain countries) for the mission in Afghanistan will start to melt away completely.
We hardly needed reminding of the growing strength and confidence of the Taliban, but this saga has done exactly that. Once again the Taliban has acted with total impunity, and it seems neither the international forces nor the Afghan government is in a position to stop them. Many more incidents like this, and the already shaky support (among certain countries) for the mission in Afghanistan will start to melt away completely.
Wednesday, April 11, 2007
"No Thanks"
The Washington Post reports that President Bush is looking for someone to oversee America's involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. But the paper says three retired generals have already refused to be Mr Bush's "war czar" which is a bit embarrassing for the administration to say the least.
The fact they want someone to come in to handle the operations shows the Bush team have realised they're on the wrong track, and are pretty much out of new ideas. But a remark from one of the men to have turned the job down indicates most people in Washington believe an outsider wouldn't be able to sway those hardline members of the administration (led by Vice President Dick Cheney) who apparently still wield the real power. Retired Marine General Jack Sheehan is quoted by the Post: "Rather than go over there, develop an ulcer and eventually leave, I said, 'No, thanks,'"
Unless Cheney and his mates release their grip on policymaking, in favour of the more pragmatic Defence Secretary Bob Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, it seems "no thanks" is the only answer Bush will get. Gates and Rice don't have all the answers to help solve the crises in Afghanistan and Iraq, but they'll find it easier to bring together people who might have a better inkling. Cheney's refusal to admit he was wrong on Iraq, and Bush's unwillingness to overrule him now, stands in the way of progress both there and in Afghanistan.
The fact they want someone to come in to handle the operations shows the Bush team have realised they're on the wrong track, and are pretty much out of new ideas. But a remark from one of the men to have turned the job down indicates most people in Washington believe an outsider wouldn't be able to sway those hardline members of the administration (led by Vice President Dick Cheney) who apparently still wield the real power. Retired Marine General Jack Sheehan is quoted by the Post: "Rather than go over there, develop an ulcer and eventually leave, I said, 'No, thanks,'"
Unless Cheney and his mates release their grip on policymaking, in favour of the more pragmatic Defence Secretary Bob Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, it seems "no thanks" is the only answer Bush will get. Gates and Rice don't have all the answers to help solve the crises in Afghanistan and Iraq, but they'll find it easier to bring together people who might have a better inkling. Cheney's refusal to admit he was wrong on Iraq, and Bush's unwillingness to overrule him now, stands in the way of progress both there and in Afghanistan.
Tuesday, February 27, 2007
Unwelcome Resurgence
The Taliban has tried and failed to kill the US Vice President Dick Cheney during his visit to Afghanistan. They were never realistically going to actually assassinate him - the sprawling complex of Bagram Airbase is far too big and too well guarded to get near him - but it's quite a statement of intent. By even attempting this sort of spectacular, the Taliban has proved just how strong their much-talked about resurgence actually is.
Five years ago what was left of the Taliban melted into the Afghan countryside and mountains, heavily beaten by the US-backed Northern Alliance. Ever since it has slowly regained its strength, and if the British-led NATO forces were to leave now, the Taliban would be well placed to take large parts of the country back under its control.
That won't happen. But NATO is struggling with a lack of manpower, caused by an unwillingness of some major countries to commit troops to the really dangerous parts of Afghanistan. That's what forced Britain to announce an extra deployment this week. And if the increasingly confident Taliban is to be kept down, it's now up to Germany, Italy and the rest to step forward.
Five years ago what was left of the Taliban melted into the Afghan countryside and mountains, heavily beaten by the US-backed Northern Alliance. Ever since it has slowly regained its strength, and if the British-led NATO forces were to leave now, the Taliban would be well placed to take large parts of the country back under its control.
That won't happen. But NATO is struggling with a lack of manpower, caused by an unwillingness of some major countries to commit troops to the really dangerous parts of Afghanistan. That's what forced Britain to announce an extra deployment this week. And if the increasingly confident Taliban is to be kept down, it's now up to Germany, Italy and the rest to step forward.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)