Bin Laden's Death A Part Of Al Qaeda's Slow Decline

Osama bin Laden is dead. The leader of Al Qaeda was apparently shot and killed at a compound in Pakistan by American special forces. He'd been in hiding for almost a decade since ordering the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

The death of bin Laden is undoubtedly symbolic. As well as being the leader of the Al Qaeda terrorist network, he was its name and, through the video messages which had such a global impact in the months and years after 9/11, he was its face.

But, in practical terms, his death will have little impact on a network which has already been in gradual decline for some years. Bin Laden has been holed up in a house with little opportunity to communicate with the outside world, so his influence on Al Qaeda's people and operations has probably been extremely limited since 2001.

Besides, Al Qaeda, which roughly translates as "the base," has never been a conventional military or guerrilla type terrorist group, such as the Tamil Tigers or IRA. It's always been a very loose affilitation of groups in assorted parts of the world, often with wildly differing views and methods. The role of Bin Laden and his chief lieutenants has usually been one of financier, facilitator and, though his favourite philosophical notion of "propaganda by deed" - suicide bombings to you and me - inspiration.

The death of Bin Laden will weaken the idea of Al Qaeda as a central network still further. Groups such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is primarily based in Yemen, will carry on regardless. But with the Arab Spring suggesting that, in some countries at least, there's a desire for a democratic rather than Islamist future, those groups increasingly look like they're alongside Bin Laden on the wrong side of history.

Somalia's Islamists Strike In Uganda

Dozens of people have been killed in a double bomb attack in the capital of Uganda, Kampala. A rugby club and an Ethiopian restaurant were the targets of the blasts, which targeted football fans watching the World Cup final. Somalia's Islamist al-Shabaab group is already being blamed.

The al-Shabaab organisation is sometimes described as having links to al-Qaeda, although as far as we know that's only true in the sense that it shares some of the aims and philosophies of Osama bin Laden's network, rather than anything more tangible like money or weapons. It formed out of the remnants of the UIC, a hardline Islamic group which briefly ran lawless Somalia in 2006, until it was overthrown by the US-backed Ethiopian army for being rather too much like the Taliban for Washington's liking.

The decision to target an Ethiopian restaurant therefore hints at al-Shabaab being behind the Kampala attacks, as does the choice of Uganda itself, as Uganda has supplied some of the African Union forces currently trying to protect what little central government there is to speak of in Somalia.

But the most significant thing about last night's attacks are their scale. al-Shabaab has grown in strength of late, partly bolstered by cash flowing into the country through ransoms paid to Somali pirates. Last winter, al-Shabaab was linked to an attack on the man responsible for the Prophet Mohammed cartoons at his home in Denmark. If that incident suggested the group was developing the ambition and capability to strike at targets abroad, the Uganda blasts confirm that both of those factors are only increasing with time. It could once again be up to US-backed Ethiopian forces to move into al-Shabaab's heartland in rural Somalia, to try to reverse that growing strength.

The Terror Threat From Somalia And Yemen

Two failed attacks, both apparently carried out by alleged Islamist terrorists, have featured prominently in global headlines over Christmas and New Year. On Christmas Day, a Nigerian man is suspected of trying to blow up a plane as it landed at Detroit. The US now says the suspect has links to an al-Qaeda group in Yemen. And in Denmark, a man with alleged ties to Somalian Islamist group al-Shabaab broke into the home of the artist responsible for the infamous Prophet Mohammed cartoons. The man has now been charged with attempted manslaughter.

And so, Yemen and Somalia are suddenly back on the radar of world leaders, with phrases such as 'incubators of terrorism' being bandied around. We're more used to hearing that sort of thing in relation to Afghanistan and north-west Pakistan, where there was also a recent deadly terrorist attack during a volleyball game. The arguments about how to deal with the security problems in those countries are often debated, but how western countries might deal with the threat posed by terrorist groups operating out of Yemen and Somalia hasn't received much public discussion in recent years. The recent attacks mean that will surely now change, but there seem to be even fewer potential solutions than there are for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Somalia's al-Shabaab formed out of the remnants of the UIC, a Taliban-style Islamist group which briefly ruled Somalia in 2006 until it was overthrown by US-backed Ethiopian forces for, well, being a bit too much like the Taliban. Since then, there's been little central government to speak of in Somalia, which is why pirates have been able to operate with such impunity from Somali ports. Some of the pirates' cash ends up going to al-Shabaab, and the Danish incident demonstrates it now has both the ability and willingness to attempt terrorist attacks abroad. If further international attacks take place, the US may be forced to turn once again to its Ethiopian allies for help in fighting al-Shabaab, the deployment of US troops to Somalia being still far too sensitive a subject following the 1993 Black Hawk Down incident.

As for Yemen, there is at least a central government, and the US has given it tens of millions of aid dollars to help root out terrorists since the attack on the USS Cole in Aden harbour in 2000. Following the failed Christmas Day bombing in Detroit, expect more help for the Yemeni authorities, including more US drones flying over remote parts of the country in an attempt to find terrorist hideouts. The solution to the Yemen problem may be a little more straightforward than that in Somalia, but the potential scale of the Detroit attack shows that al-Qaeda in Yemen already has the ambition to strike at major targets in the US homeland. The Obama administration knows it must act quickly in Yemen before the next terrorist plot becomes a reality.

The Big Question In Afghanistan Is What Happens After 2011

President Obama has finally made his long-awaited announcement on the future of US strategy in Afghanistan. He's sending an extra 30,000 American troops, with the health warning that they will begin to withdraw in 2011. The decision has met with a sceptical response in Afghanistan itself.

The stated aim of the western military involvement in Afghanistan is to fight Al Qaeda and its Taliban allies, and make it harder for Islamist terrorists to attack targets in the west. One of the major criticisms of the increased western involvement in recent months is that now the troops are focusing not just on fighting the west's enemies, but also on trying to protect and strengthen the Afghan government (which, as the controversial recent election showed, is widely corrupt). Critics call it 'mission creep' and accuse Mr Obama and others of trying to find new reasons to justify their involvement in Afghanistan, when they should have pulled out already.

That's believed to be the view of the US Vice-President, Joe Biden. But for leaders like Mr Obama and Gordon Brown, there's more to consider, namely what'll happen when the western troops withdraw. Now that Mr Obama has named 2011 as the start of the end of the mission (as an answer to one of the big criticisms of America's mission in Iraq, namely that there was no exit strategy), that deadline will dominate the way all interested parties act in Afghanistan. And it may end up to the Taliban's advantage.

The Taliban now knows that, if it can avoid complete obliteration over the next couple of years (with help from sympathisers in Pakistan, this shouldn't be a problem), the western troops will go home. Then it can take on the Afghan government. The Taliban did exactly that when it initially seized power in Afghanistan back in 1996. It was a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in which Al Qaeda harboured and trained the terrorists which carried out 9/11.

So, if the US and its allies are unable to help the Afghan government improve its security capabilities sufficiently in the coming months, there could be big trouble ahead. Leaving Afghanistan in 2011 might suit short-term western political opinion, but if the Taliban is able to regain control once the Americans have left, it would probably allow Al Qaeda the opportunity to strengthen, and therefore make a spectacular attack on the US or Europe far more likely. Although it may cause an increase in the human cost in terms of American, British and other international lives, spending the time between now and 2011 putting the Afghans in a position to defeat the Taliban is essential to the ultimate success of the west's mission.

Here's Some Money, Now Make The Problem Go Away

The US has agreed to supply military equipment to the army of Mali in north Africa, to help them fight Islamist extremists. The Malians are getting about five million dollars worth of stuff, in addition to assistance already being offered by neighbouring Algeria and Libya. They're up against a group calling itself Al Qaeda In The Islamic Maghreb, which has carried out dozens of attacks in the area over the last couple of years, including the capture and murder of Briton Edwin Dyer.

If five million dollars doesn't sound like a lot to you, well, you're right, it's not. Or at least it isn't that much in the context of global military resources. The reason the US doesn't feel the need to break the bank to help is that this particular wing of Al Qaeda is small, with maybe only a few hundred members at most. It emerged from the a much larger force of Algerian Islamists which spent most of the 90s fighting a civil war in that country, after a Muslim party was denied certain victory in an election by government chicanery.

That conflict died down years ago, but the radical strain of Islam has lived on through this small group of extremists, who allied themselves to Al Qaeda in 2007. This was basically an attempt to make themselves look big and important, in the hope they'd get more money and assistance from other Islamists elsewhere in the world. It's possible that this has actually happened, because the group has been able to carry out the odd notable terrorist incident since then. This is what has got America's attention.

You might wonder why the US would bother sending any money at all to deal with such an apparently insignificant enemy, so far away from home. Yet Washington knows it's just possible an American citizen or citizens could end up suffering the same fate as Edwin Dyer, and doesn't want to take the chance. By giving Mali money and equipment only, the US is accepting none of the risk of the security operation, but should get the reward that at least an attack against Americans becomes a more remote possibility. To the folks in the State Department, that's well worth five million dollars.

Endgame At Guantanamo

The man who was allegedly the main plotter behind the 9/11 attacks on the US has told a pre-trial hearing that he wants to plead guilty. Four of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's co-defendants have done the same. This all happened in a military tribunal at America's Guantanamo Bay base in Cuba, where the men and hundreds of others have been held for several years.

Most of the people held in such controversial circumstances at Guantanamo since 2001 are, if not entirely innocent, certainly guilty of not much more than being in the wrong place at the wrong time - Afghanistan in the winter of 2001/02, when a large number of them were arrested. The story of the Tipton Three, three young British men who apparently got caught up in the excitement of the time and ended up in the Taliban sronghold of Kunduz as the Northern Alliance closed in, is not unusual. It's been the detention of those suspects and others like them that's caused such damage to America's international reputation.

KSM and the other four are different. These are the real senior bad guys the US had in mind when it set up the detention centre at Guantanamo. But all the evidence suggests suspects of that level are in a significant minority, perhaps only a few dozen of the men held at the base. However, with President-elect Obama having already said he intends to close Guantanamo, the issue of what to do with these suspected al Qaeda operatives will no doubt be troubling him.

Mr Obama's got two groups of people to worry about most as he ponders how exactly to close Guantanamo. The first group is those men with stories like the Tipton Three's who are still held at the base, either because their home countries refuse to accept them back, or because the US knows the men would be tortured if they were returned to those countries. Beyond offering these men asylum in the US, it's difficult to see what Mr Obama can do. That would undoubtedly be a huge risk as, even though most of the men probably have no intention of carrying out any kind of terrorist act, there's always a chance one or two or more might.

Then there's those 80 or so real bad guys. Suggestions from the Obama team point towards putting them on trial in some kind of hybrid military/civilian court, possibly in America itself, possibly not. The major difficulty in getting convictions (in cases in which the defendants don't plead guilty) will be the use of torture on the suspects during their period of detention. Any half-decent defence lawyer should be able to pick plenty of holes in any prosecution case containing evidence gleaned from such interrogations. But however Mr Obama decides to resolve those problems, it seems as though we're now entering the endgame for Guantanamo.

Terror In Mumbai

Terrorist gunmen have killed more than 100 people and injured a further 300 in a series of co-ordinated attacks on targets in India's financial capital, Mumbai (Bombay to you and me). The attackers opened fire at luxury hotels, hospitals, a well-known cafe and a railway station. The head of Mumbai's anti-terrorist squad is among the dead.

Blame's already being attached to the banned Students Islamic Movement of India, and its Indian Mujahideen offshoot. A previously-unknown group calling itself the Deccan Mujahideen has said it carried out the attacks, and it seems probable that it's linked to the SIMI and IM. But the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has also said he believes the attackers have links outside India, and there are good reasons to suspect he might be right.

The Mumbai shootings show a surprise shift in tactics from the Islamist terrorists. Past attacks in India have usually involved leaving bombs at various targets in the traditional way. This onslaught, featuring a mixture of gunfire, hostage-taking and men clearly willing to die in the act of terrorism, is clearly different. The fact that gunmen targeted places used by westerners, and witness reports that they tried to single out those with American and British passports, indicate something of an Al Qaeda-style dimension to these attacks. There's no sign (yet) Al Qaeda itself had anything directly to do with what happened in Mumbai. But it seems its tactics of suicide and of targeting westerners influenced those who carried out the attacks. Expect the dramatic and audacious nature of this incident to inspire others in the future.

"We Have Not Asked For Iran's Help"

The radical Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has given an interesting and rare interview to the Independent, in which he denies claims Iran has been arming and helping his private militia army in its battle against the British and Americans in Iraq. He also tells the paper his Mehdi Army has played "an important role" in forcing British commanders to realise it's a war they can't win.

It's difficult to believe his denials about Iran. Although it's certainly in Washington's interests to try to paint the Iranians as among the villains in Iraq, there seems to be compelling evidence that elements within Iran are helping the Mehdi Army and others build the bombs that regularly kill and maim US and British soldiers.

But al-Sadr has two other interesting things to say, that could point to a better future for Iraq. First, he seems to suggest al Qaeda is as much an enemy of his group as the US. He says those Shias who've stood against the terror network in Ramadi have "written their names into our history books." Any hopes al Qaeda might have to turn Iraq into the sort of haven it used to enjoy in Afghanistan therefore seem far-fetched.

Then there's his remarks on the UN, saying: "if the UN comes here to truly help the Iraqi people, they will receive our help in their work." Whatever happens in Iraq once the Americans and British have gone home, a much bigger role for the UN is clearly essential.

Making It Up As He Goes Along

One of the main contenders for the Democrat nomination for the US presidential election, Barack Obama, has some pretty tough things to say about Pakistan. As President Obama, he says he'd be willing to strike Al Qaeda targets within Pakistan, with or without the approval of that country's government.

What he means here is that he'd be prepared to authorise a strike aimed directly at Osama bin Laden himself. Pakistan insists bin Laden's not in their country, and although most people in western intelligence services seem to think differently, it's not really considered good form for a presidential candidate to start criticising an ally, so Mr Obama won't be so explicit as to name the likely target of such a strike.

Mr Obama's real mission though is to try to prove to Americans he's got just as much hard-headed foreign policy nous as his main rival, Hillary Clinton. In the recent YouTube debate, he rather naively said he'd be happy to meet the leaders of various US bogey countries (Venezuela, Iran, etc) within a year of taking office, and was rightly criticised for it by Mrs Clinton. She's luckier than her rival, in that she's got some of her dad's old mates, such as Richard Holbrooke, around to steer her through the murky world of foreign affairs. This rather rash language on Pakistan shows Mr Obama could do with some help, too.

Covering His Back

The US Homeland Security Chief, Michael Chertoff, has this week said he's got a "gut feeling" the US will be attacked by al Qaeda this summer. His comments in an interview with the Chicago Tribune are pretty surprising. It's one thing for politicians and others to warn people to be on their guard against terrorists, as they do all the time, but quite another to pretty much predict an attack's going to happen.

Mr Chertoff is simply covering his own back here. It's been six years since the last al Qaeda attack on US soil, and the law of averages suggests there's got to be another one sometime. He just doesn't want anyone to say to him after it happens that he didn't do enough to warn the public.

In many ways it's much harder for al Qaeda to attack the US than, say, Britain. Here we've got larger Muslim populations in many cities, and a traditionally more relaxed approach to Islamist preachers spouting extreme views. That means it's easier for would-be terrorists to blend in here, and indeed convert others (including whites such as Anthony Garcia from the Crevice plot) to the Islamist cause. But as Mr Chertoff knows, that doesn't mean America is safe. Nobody will be too surprised if his gut feeling turns out to be accurate.

Where's Osama?

Al Qaeda's number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has threatened a terrorist attack on Britain because of the decision to give Salman Rushdie a knighthood. Predictably enough, Downing Street says it won't give in to such warnings. The audio tape turned up on an Islamist website, and is the latest in a series by al-Zawahiri over the last few years. Leaving aside the whole debate about Rushdie and how serious this threat is, there's another question - where's al-Zawahiri's boss?

We haven't seen Osama bin Laden in two and a half years. The last video message he gave was broadcast shortly before the US Presidential election of November 2004. There's been the odd audio message since then, as well as videos containing re-hashed bits of old footage, but nothing we can say for sure is definitely new.

So why so shy? It could be that Osama bin Laden is actually dead, although I can't help thinking we'd have heard about it if that was the case. Not least because al-Zawahiri and others would no doubt fancy taking the top job for themselves.

It's more likely he's now so worried about using any form of communication, including satellite phones and the like, he just moves between various remote hiding places without ever talking to anyone outside his close clique. And that clique may now be very small indeed, to avoid any kind of infiltration. It was tracking of communications and infiltration that did for the much more media-visible ex-leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. It may be we'll only ever hear firm news about Osama bin Laden one more time - when he's finally killed, or just dies.

Trouble At The Red Mosque

Pakistani special forces have stormed a mosque in Islamabad, where a radical cleric was holed up with Islamist fighters and a large number of hostages. It's after a week-long siege at the complex, and the operation began following the failure of surrender talks. Although eight soldiers are among those killed so far, the mission seems to be going relatively well, especially when compared with how the Russians handled the Moscow theatre siege five years ago.

This is the latest round in the battle for control for Pakistan, between the pro-western President Musharraf, and the Islamists who help the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the north-west of the country, where it borders Afghanistan. Musharraf is proving to his western allies he's not afraid to use force, even in a mosque - an action which certainly runs the risk of further angering members of the public who might already be sympathetic to the extremists.

Although it's a welcome signal, it's not enough to win the battle against the Islamists, who among other things are probably continuing to shelter Osama bin Laden somewhere in northern Pakistan. That's as much a battle of ideas and ideologies as it is one of guns and military force, and a much harder one to win. This sort of well-handled operation at least proves the Pakistani government is taking the problem seriously, and wants the right outcome. But it's now even more important for the Pakistanis to make sure they win the propaganda battle following this incident, so it doesn't simply lead to more angry recruits for the Islamists.

Uncivil War

There are conflicting reports over whether the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, has been killed or not. The US and Iraqis can't confirm stories saying he died while fighting against a group of Sunni Arab insurgents.

Whether he's dead or not isn't particularly significant. If he is, there'll be someone ready to take his place in a job that doesn't exactly have great prospects for a long and successful career. What is important is the manner of his reported death. The US and Iraqis have long claimed that Al Qaeda isn't welcome in Iraq, and its operations are mostly carried out by terrorists who have gone to Iraq from other countries. The apparent fact that groups of Sunni insurgents are actually fighting against Al Qaeda, presumably because of anger at their random attacks on civilians, proves the Americans and Iraqis are largely right about that.

Not that who's killing who makes much difference to the Iraqi civilians who are dying in the civil war. Twenty percent fewer Iraqis were killed last month than in March. But that's still 1,506 people. If Al Qaeda is on the wane in Iraq, its battle with the US in the 'war on terror' will doubtless continue elsewhere. However, the war between Sunni and Shia Muslims in Iraq will outlast the withdrawal of US and British forces, and there'll be many more months ahead when fifteen hundred innocent civilians are killed. The death of one Al Qaeda terrorist won't change that.

The Stakes Get Higher

The Somali government has confirmed the Islamic insurgency in the country is now being commanded by a well-known Al Qaeda figure. Aden Hashi Ayro trained in Afghanistan, and is now said to be personally directing operations as heavy fighting with Ethiopian-backed government troops rages for a second day in Mogadishu.

The Somalis are hoping to paint this conflict as part of the wider war on terror. They believe the best way to attract more international support, especially from Washington, is to emphasise the Al Qaeda links of the rebels they're fighting. The US won't commit any troops to Somalia - not after its disastrous intervention there in 1993 - but the Somalis presumably reckon at least having American sympathy will help them. And they might be right. The more established the fledgling government becomes in international eyes, the better their chances of seeing off the Islamic rebels.

Happy Birthday

Just a few days after Osama Bin Laden turned 50, the EU is marking the same anniversary. Beyond tonight's pointless football game at Old Trafford, the birthday's passing with a pleasing lack of the self-satisfied ceremony we've come to expect from the union.

Not that the EU hasn't got a lot to be satisfied about. Leaving aside all the bickering that's made it so unpopular in many countries, including Britain, it has been a spectacular success in achieving the main reason it was set up in the first place: to make sure there won't ever be another massive war involving the whole continent. Bitter debates over fishing quotas are a lot better than fighting real battles over chunks of central Europe.

With the EU probably the greatest force for peace in the modern world, Bin Laden is arguably the greatest force for war. Although his powers seem to be on the wane (it's nearly two and a half years since we last saw new pictures of him), he and his Al Qaeda mates will have a big influence on our lives for a while yet. But I think the EU will endure a lot longer, and that's something we should all be pretty pleased about.